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Introduction
Before the Civil War there was widespread recognition that
the state legislatures were abusing their power to enact special and
local legislation.' There was no doubt at all that power to enact
statutes of this character existed under the accepted American
theory that the power of state legislatures is plenary except as
specifically restricted. It was equally certain that there were
proper occasions for the use of a special statute. A law for the re-
lief of a particular person under circumstances thought to create
a moral obligation on the part of the state but where no remedy
was otherwise provided is an example. However, the state leg-
islatures, Ohio's included,2 abused special statutes by passing
them in numbers out of all proportion to need and without any
serious attempt by the whole memberships of the legislatures to
examine the merits of proposed bills. Those members whose con-
stituents were immediately affected usually sponsored the legis-
lation and log-rolling tactics customarily resulted in its adoption.
The abuse of special legislation became the normal state of affairs.
Municipalities became the particular victims of irresponsible legis-
lative majorities.3 There is no evidence to support the view that
special statutes were used because they were considered more
effective in the circumstances as a matter of policy. Rather, the
view was that the legislature could more effectively maintain its
own overriding control by the use of specialism.
Constitutional provisions were supplied in order to prevent
special legislation in those situations where general legislation
could do the job more effectively or in situations where special
legislation was believed to have been abused.4 At the present time
* Sterling Fellow, Yale Law School; Teaching and Research Assistant, the
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I For a discussion of the background of legislative abuse of special laws,
see Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L. J. 351, 355-358
(1936).
2 For a discussion of legislative abuse of special laws in Ohio, see Walker,
Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 Omo STATE L. J. 1 (1948).
3 Many state constitutions now contain express prohibitions against spe-
cial legislation regulating municipalities as well as a general provision against
special legislation. See, e.g., MVnm. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 33.
4 See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsrTucTioN § 2101 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
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there are several types of such state constitutional provisions. Mis-
souri, for example, prohibits local and special laws in twenty-nine
enumerated instances and in any instances where a general law
can be made to apply.5 It is expressly provided that the problem
of the applicability of a general law is a judicial question.6 A num-
ber of states simply have the general provision that no special law
can be enacted where a general law can be made applicable. Where
the state constitutions do not speak to the point there is a division
of opinion among the courts as to the 'judiciality" of the provi-
sion.3 A third group of states prohibit special laws when there is
already a general law on the subject.9 This small group, in effect,
permits legislative determination of generality or specialty but
does not allow both general and special legislation to co-exist on
the same subject. Ohio belongs to still another group. All of the
states which prohibit or restrict special legislation stand in con-
spicuous contrast to the federal government which has no such
limitation in its basic law.10 Some of the states have no constitu-
tional provisions dealing with the subject.
The most important of the various Ohio constitutional pro-
visions concerned with special and general legislation is Article II,
Section 26, which provides, in part, "All laws, of a general nature,
shall have a uniform operation throughout the State. . ." A def-
inition of "laws, of a general nature" is not provided. Perhaps the
provision of a guide to the meaning of the phrase was regarded as
superfluous by the members of the Constitutional Convention of
1851 who were probably quite sure that the clause was aimed at
the then plethora of special and local legislation and required no
explanation beyond the facts which brought it into existence. In
any event, a substantial body of case law has been applied to its
interpretation.
Article II, Section 26,11 is written in general language and has
been held to apply to all subjects except those explicitly and ex-
S Mo. CoNsT. Art. III, § 40. Many of the enumerated items are applicable
to local government units.
6 Mo. Co-s'T. Art. I, § 40, sub. 30.
7 See, e.g., Mic. CONST. Art. 5, § 30.
3 See 2 SUTHERLAM, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTboN § 2103 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
9 See, e.g,. PA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 7.
10 The equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution is, however, relevant to the problem of classifica-
tion. "Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited
in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all per-
sons similarly situated, is not within the amendment." Barbier v. Connolly,
M3 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
I The Ohio constitutional provisions will be frequently referred to only
by article and section numbers.
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clusively provided for by other sections of the constitution. Article
IV, Section 1, for example, empowers the legislature "from time
to time" to establish courts inferior to the courts of appeal and the
general laws provision of the constitution is considered inappli-
cable.12 In the same way, Article II, Section 30, requires special
legislation for establishing new counties, changing county lines, or
removing county seats.13 The requirement is implicit but clear
because general legislation would be inconsistent with the pro-
cedure established in the constitutional provision.
Section 32 of Article II expressly provides that the legislature
"shall grant no divorce", so it is unnecessary to consider what effect
Article II, Section 26, standing alone, would have as to legislative
divorces. Another express prohibition on special legislation is
found in Article XIII, Section 1, which declares quite simply, "[t]he
General Assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate
powers." This provision applies to municipal as well as private
corporations. 14
Complementary to the provision just quoted is Section 2 of
Article XIII which requires general laws for the creation and
regulation of private corporations. Section 6 of the same article
requires the legislature to "provide for the organization of cities
and incorporated villages, by general laws." Both municipal and
private corporations were justly regarded as important and partic-
ularly dangerous subjects of special legislation, hence their specific
prohibition in addition to the general one found in Article II, Sec-
tion 26.
In short, Article II, Section 26 (frequently referred to in this
article as the general laws provision) is of general applicability
except as limited by other parts of the constitution.'5 The common
sense rule of constitutional interpretation that the particular pro-
vision most closely related to the subject matter in question will
be held applicable has been adhered to in Ohio. Curative statutes,
not covered in Article II, Section 26, are permitted with certain
restrictions in Section 28 of the same article.
12 Neither the offocial syllabus nor the opinion in State ex rel. Fox v.
Yeatman, 89 Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913), wherein a special statute concern-
ing a municipal court was upheld, mentioned Article II, Section 26.
1 3Article X, Section 1, requires general laws for the organization and
government of counties.
14 State ex rel Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 NE. 424 (1902); Cin-
cinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital, 66 Ohio St. 440, 64 N.E. 420 (1902).
Is In Ex Parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638 (1885) it was held that Article 11,
Section 26 was mandatory rather than merely directory.
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General Laws - Classification
A. MuNIcIP . CoEPoRAxroNs
As has been indicated already, the problem of specialism has
been particularly acute in the field of municipal corporations. 16 It
is, therefore, the plan of this article to consider first the require-
ments of generality as applied to municipal corporations both be-
cause of the intrinsic importance of the subject and because it is
believed that an analysis of the requirements as to municipalities
will provide considerable informational background for the subjects
to be considered at a later juncture.
1. Historical development prior to 1851.
It should be mentioned at once that the historical background
of municipal government in Ohio has been carefully and fully
analyzed in the pages of this Journal in an article by Professor
Harvey Walker.'7 The treatment here will be confined to a brief
survey of the use of special and general legislation in relation to
municipalities prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1851.
In territorial times the small number of municipal units were
incorporated by occasional special legislation. There is no reason
to believe that the method was not adequate to the situation pre-
sented. Even if the use of general laws would have been preferable,
the small amount of special legislation relating to municipalities
did not burden the legislature.
Under the first Ohio Constitution 8 the legislature was left
free to deal with municipalities as it saw fit. There was not even
the possibility of gubernatorial veto to act as a brake. Beginning
with Chillicothe' 9 in 1804, a series of special acts was passed. In
1817 the first general law for the incorporation of municipalities
was passed by the legislature. 20 The incorporation procedure uti-
lized is interesting today principally because of the use of the court
of common pleas as a fact-finding agency.
Following the passage of the general incorporation law of
1817 there was, for a few years, a substantial lessening in the num-
ber of special charters granted. Particular amendments to previ-
ously-granted special charters continued in undiminished volume.
The general act of 1817, however, appeared for a while to have
substantially reduced the total amount of special legislation even
though it only briefly stopped special chartering. By 1834 the
situation had so deteriorated that the Thirty-third General Assem-
bly passed fifty-eight pages of general laws in contrast to four
1 6 See note 3 supra.
17 Walker, supra note 2.
Is Constitution of 1802 which became effective in 1803.
19 Act of Feb. 18, 1804.
20 Act of Jan. 7, 1817.
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hundred sixty-five pages of special and local laws. In 1838 the
legislature came to its own rescue by passing another general in-
corporation law.21 For a few years the special acts passed referred
to the general law for provisions as to organization or powers, but
by 1844 this practice was reversed and the tendency to do every-
thing in the special statute reappeared. The Forty-eighth General
Assembly demonstrated how well the old system was re-established
by passing seven hundred sixty-seven pages of special and local
laws and only one hundred twenty-nine pages of general ones. In
May, 1850, when the Second Constitutional Convention of Ohio
met, there was apparently widespread belief that something should
be done to relieve the legislature of the crushing burden of special
legislation and the municipalities themselves of the evils of legis-
lative log-rolling.
2. The Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851
Delegate James W. Taylor of Erie County stated his view of
the existing situation in the course of the debate on the floor of
the convention which framed the Constitution of 1851: "[ilt has
been frequently said that three-fourths of the laws of Ohio are
special and local in their nature; and I believe that an effort will
be made to confine the Legislature to general regulations exclu-
sively. '2 2 The effort was made and succeeded even though the
Convention appeared to spend more time, insofar as the debates
are indicative, on the problem of general incorporation laws for
private corporations. There is no record of debate on any of the
provisions of Article XIII which was accepted by the Convention
on March 10, 1851.23 The significant section, as far as municipalities
were concerned, was the sixth which provides, in part: "The Gen-
eral Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and
incorporated villages, by general laws. . ." Probably no member
of the Convention of 1850-1851 had any idea of the vagaries of
judicial interpretation to which this section would be subjected.
The first section, which also has importance for municipalities,
provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no special act con-
ferring corporate powers."
Two basic sections were placed in Article II, the portion of the
constitution dealing with the legislature, which were to have far-
reaching general influence. Section 26, the provision requiring
general laws to have uniform operation, has already been men-
tioned. Section 28 provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall
have no power to pass retroactive laws, . . . but may, by general
laws, authorize courts to carry into effect upon such terms as shall
21 Act of Feb. 16, 1838.
22 1 Ohio Convention Debates 285 (1851).
23 2 Ohio Convention Debates 851 (1851).
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be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, and officers,
by curing omissions, defects and errors, in instruments and pro-
ceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of
this State." It is apparent at a glance that both of these sections are
applicable to statutes dealing with local government in general as
well as to municipal corporations. The language in Section 26 re-
quiring "uniform operation" apparently calls for judicial interpre-
tation, whereas the wording of Section 28 requiring curative stat-
utes to be general ones seems to be more precise and meaningful
standing alone.
In Case v. Dillon24 the court considered the validity of an act
passed on March 24, 1851 (prior to the effective date of the Con-
stitution of 1851) which authorized Muskingum County to subscribe
to the capital stock of a specified railway corporation. Article VIII,
Section 6, of the new constitution provided that the "General As-
sembly shall never authorize any county, town, or township" to
become a stockholder in any corporation. By a three-to-two vote
the court upheld the statute, primarily on the ground that the new
constitutional provision was only prospective in operation. The case
is significant for our purposes because the court first undertook
to interpret Article II, Section 26, in it. Judge Thurman, writing
for the majority, appeared to assume at once that the statute was
not of a general nature. He wrote, "[i]t is no more of a general na-
ture than would be an act to authorize the construction of a bridge
or the erection of a poorhouse. '25 The corollary found by the court
was that the act was necessarily, by its nature, a local one and so
the constitutional provision dealing with laws of a general nature
was inapplicable. There was no indication that the court considered
the possibility that legislation authorizing local government invest-
ment in private corporations might be a proper subject for a
general law. By uncritically seizing upon the idea that certain
subjects were local in nature, the court opened the door to wide-
spread evasion of the constitutional mandate of uniformity of oper-
ation. The vigorous dissent of Judge Ranney did not discuss Article
II, Section 26.26
3. The Period 1851-1912
In 1852 it would have appeared to a careful observer that the
new constitution had achieved its aims insofar as general legislation
was concerned. Proof would have been found in that the special
laws of 1852 comprised forty-seven pages while the general ones
filled three hundred forty-eight pages. On May 3, 1852, existing
laws relating to the organization and government of municipal
24 2 Ohio St. 607 (1853).
25 Id. at 617.
26 Id. at 624-647 (dissenting opinion).
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corporations were repealed and, by the same general statute, means
were provided for the organization of "cities and incorporated vil-
lages". Municipal corporations were divided into three broad
classes: cities of the first class were all those of over 20,000 pop-
ulation; cities of the second class were units below that figure with
a population of at least 5,000; villages were of less than 5,000 pop-
ulation. By an amendment of March 25, 1854, a local option pro-
vision was inserted in the general law: a municipal corporation
would not advance to the next higher population grouping without
the approval of its council. The symmetry of the classification
scheme could, thus, be impaired at the will of a municipal council.
During the fifty-year period from 1852 to 1902 the legislature
departed radically from the three-class arrangement it had followed
immediately after the adoption of the new constitution. By 1880
generality in form had become a cloak for specialty in fact.
In one term of court, in just a few months, the entire classi-
fication structure so painstakingly built up over a period of years
was brought crashing down to earth.27 When the January, 1902
Term of the Ohio Supreme Court commenced there was a plethora
of classifications. Each of the eleven largest cities of the state was
placed in a different grade of the hierarchy. Special legislation
under the guise of classification had become sanctified by the pass-
age of time and implicit judicial approval. The members of the
legislative department had little reason to suspect that the judicial
department would say nay to what had been done.
In 1900 the legislature had passed a "general" law empowering
Toledo to construct or repair a bridge across the Maumee River in
which Toledo was described as "any city of the third grade of the
first class" having a "navigable river or rivers, passing into or
through any such city. '28 In Platt v. Craig29 a taxpayer asked that
defendant officials of the city be restrained from proceeding under
the statute. At about the same time another taxpayer asked man-
damus to compel the mayor of Toledo to submit to the voters the
question of acting under the permissive statute.3 0 The decision
resolved both disputes. Judge Davis, speaking for a unamimous
court, immediately stated that constitutional questions were pre-
sented and disclaimed any intention to reconcile the previous
decisions in the area, after pointing out that some of them were
based on expediency. He then stated that the constitution, having
emanated from the people, "must be construed as the people must
have understood it"31 and, with the aid of a dictionary, determined
27The January, 1902 Term.
28 Act of April 14, 1900.
29 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N.E. 594 (1902).
30 Jones, Mayor of Toledo v. State ex rel. Walbridge, supra, note 29.
31 66 Ohio St. 75, 77, 63 N.E. 594, 595 (1902).
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that the words "general" and "special" were antonyms. The court
concluded that the classification was "exceedingly artificial and a
sham '32 and that the statute was unconstitutional as violative
of Article XIII, Section 1, and, in the alternative, Article II, Section
26. The reasoning as to the former was that the statute was special
in that it applied only to Toledo and that it was a forbidden attempt
to confer corporate powers. The latter section was violated be-
cause, even if it was a law of a general nature, it was limited to
one particular city. There was a dictum to the effect that Article
II, Section 26, did not prohibit all special legislation and that an
emergency could legalize some special legislation.33 Judge Burket
did not concur in this portion of the opinion or syllabus. The
Platt case revealed the weakness of the structure of classification
but its practical effect was limited to a vitiation of the one statute
before the court.
The Platt case was decided on March 18, 1902. On the following
April 29th the legislature passed a special statute expressly appli-
cable only to the Cincinnati Hospital which purported to confer
certain additional powers on the trustees of the hospital. The
hospital was a municipal institution and, at the request of a tax-
payer, the corporation counsel sued to enjoin the issuance of bonds
and the expenditure of money under the statute. The case came
before the court in Cincinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital3 4
and the defendants pleaded a local and temporary emergency in
Cincinnati in reliance on the emergency language in the Platt case.
The court about-faced and said, "[a] sufficient answer to this con-
tention is that such doctrine is not decided in nor encouraged by
the case cited." 35 It would have been more candid to admit what
was said in Platt, including the statement of the emergency doc-
trine in the official syllabus, and to reach the result in the Cin-
cinnati Hospital case on the basis of new-found wisdom. Instead
the court said that the second paragraph of the syllabus and the
opinion related only to Article H, Section 26.36 While this state-
ment was entirely accurate, it should not have been allowed to
obscure the identity of the fact patterns in the two cases. Both
were cases in which a municipal corporation was to receive cor-
porate power from an abortive statute. The court went on to
say that "[i] t was obvious not only to the member of the court
who wrote the opinion in that case [the Platt case], but to all
32 Id. at 81, 63 N.E. at 596.
33 See id. at 78, 63 N.. at 596.
34 66 Ohio St. 440, 64 N.E. 420 (1902).
3S Id. at 447, 64 N.E. at 422.
36 The court did not think that the syllabus related to Article X=I, Sec-
tion 1.
1950]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of us, that the unconditional terms of the inhibition against spe-
cial acts conferring corporate power would not admit of any ex-
ception. '3 7 The syllabus of the Cincinnati Hospital case made no
mention of Article II, Section 26, and the opinion does not decide
whether it was violated. The decision was based on violation of
Article XIII, Section 1, by the statute which purported to confer
corporate powers on the hospital trustees.
In State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones,38 decided two days after the
Cincinnati Hospital case, an act of April 27, 1902, was held un-
constitutional. The action was an original one in mandamus brought
in the supreme court by the unfortunate petitioners, newly ap-
pointed police commissioners of Toledo under the act of April 27,
1902, to compel the defendants, incumbent commissioners, to sur-
render commission property. The act provided for "the appoint-
ment, regulation, and government of a police force in cities of the
third grade of the first class." That it affected no municipality but
Toledo was admitted. The attorney general, for the petitioners,
relied on the long line of decisions sustaining classification and
pointed out that there was no law on the subject except the one
under which petitioners claimed as it had expressly repealed all
other laws on the subject. The defense relied on Article XIII, Sec-
tion 1, which had been such a bulwark in the Cincinnati Hospital
case. The unanimous opinion of the court was delivered by Judge
Shauck, who brushed aside relators' contention that there was no
other law on the subject by pointing out that the repealing section
of the act under attack would fall unless the rest were valid. Judge
Shauck then proceeded to make a twofold argument: first, that
the statute attempting to reorganize the board of police commis-
sioners of Toledo was a special act granting corporate powers con-
trary to the prohibition of Article XIII, Section 1; and, secondly,
that the classification of cities of the third grade of the first class
was a sham as it only included Toledo. The second branch of the
argument received detailed consideration. The history of the classi-
fication of municipalities was reviewed and it was pointed out that
the existing absurd number of classifications was similar to the sit-
uation existing prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1851.
The court found further evidence of legislative intent to use classi-
fication as a cloak for special legislation in Section 1546 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Ohio which provided that "[c]ities of the second
class which hereafter become cities of the first class, shall constitute
the fourth grade of the latter class." There were no cities of the
fourth grade of the first class; it was just insurance against second
class cities moving into the classification with Toledo. It was point-
37 66 Ohio St. 440, 447, 64 N.E. 420, 422 (1902).
38 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902).
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ed out that the population differences between the various grad-
ations of municipalities were too narrow to be significant. The
court concluded that those considerations which tended to take the
statute out of Article XIII, Section 1, tended to place it within the
prohibition of Article II, Section 26. In the KniseIy case, in short,
the court indicated that it would no longer sanction legislative
evasion of the constitution and that the pretence that the classi-
fications were meaningful would no longer be kept up.
Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Beacom39 was the last case in
the series and it demolished the structure on the same day that
the Knisely case was decided. Petitioners brought an action in quo
warranto against the defendants, certain key municipal officers of
Cleveland, and alleged that the act of March 16, 1891 under which
defendants claimed office was invalid. The act in question oper-
ated on cities "of the second grade of the first class." Cleveland
was the only Ohio city in that class. Judge Shauck, again speaking
for a unanimous court, invalidated the statute on the authority
of the Knisely case. In answer to the argument that the de facto
government of the city should not be disturbed after the passage
of years during which legislation of this character had not been
disapproved, the court replied that, "[i]t is admitted that no limi-
tation bars inquiry into the title of the defendants. '40 Judgment
of ouster was granted and, because of the practical considerations
of the maintainence of municipal government in Cleveland, exe-
cution of the judgment was suspended until October 2, 1902.
The governor called a special session of the General Assembly
which met on August 25, 1902, and prepared a new municipal
code.4 1 The Municipal Code of 190242 swung to the opposite pole
from isolation of municipalities into separate classes under the
guise of classification: all municipal units in the state were placed
in two classes. Those municipalities with a population of 5,000 or
more were made cities and all below 5,000 were designated villages.
Each of the groups was furnished with one uniform governmental
scheme. This was no hardship for the villages but it created a sit-
uation for the cities which was as bad as, or worse than, that exist-
ing before the judical ax fell. It was unworkable for a city such as
Cleveland to have the same governmental structure and powers as
a municipality of 5,500 or 6,000 population. The use of only two
classes resulted in over-simplification of the problems of the most
populous cities. However, it had one advantage. It placed the larg-
er cities in such an impossible situation that their citizens became
39 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N.E. 427 (1902).
40 1d at 507, 64 N.E. at 428 (1902).
41 See Fairlie, The Municipal Crisis in Ohio, 1 Mxcm. L. REv. 352 (1903).
42 Act of Oct. 22, 1902.
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leaders in the municipal home rule movement. The results achieved
by the Constitutional Convention of 1912 were in no small measure
due to the felt necessities of the larger urban areas.
The Municipal Code of 1902 was upheld as a general act, hav-
ing a uniform operation throughout the state in Zunstein v. Mul-
len.43 The attack was fundamentally based on the claim that the
provision for a different number of councilmen in different cities
in reality constituted special legislation in the form of isolated
classes according to the old scheme. The different provision for
councilmen was based on a sliding scale closely keyed to population
and the court found no difficulty in upholding it. Chief Justice
Burket's opinion for the still unanimous court was notable for its
analytical discussion and resolution of the claimed ambiguity in
the method of computing the number of councilmen under the
statute.
4. The Present Constitutional Classification of Cities.
(a) An exclusive population classification.
The adoption of Article XVIII, the "home rule amendment",
transferred the dual classification of the Municipal Code of 1902
into the organic law. Section 1 provided for classification of muni-
cipalities as follows:
Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities
and villages. All such corporations having a population of
five thousand or over shall be cities; all others shall be
villages. The method of transition from one class to the
other shall be regulated by law.
Section 2 of Article XVIII provided, in part, that, "[g]eneral
laws shall be passed to provide for the incorporation and govern-
ment of cities and villages." The two provisions just quoted did
not result in placing the larger municipalities in the kind of a
strait-jacket that they existed in from 1902 to 1912. Substantive
home rule powers were granted directly to municipalities by other
sections of Article XVIII and were not contingent upon the adop-
tion of a home rule charter.44 Thus, all municipalities were grant-
ed power under Section 3 to adopt and enforce "such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws."
It should be emphasized that Article XVIII, Section 1, pro-
vides an exclusive classification of municipalities as to population.
There is nothing in the section which would or should exclude
further classification on the basis of relevant factors unconnected
with population.
(b) Classification as charter and non-charter.
43 67 Ohio St. 382, 66 N.E. 140 (1902).
44 See Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice,
9 Oro ST. L. J. 18 (1948).
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In Dillon v. Cleveland45 the court examined Ohio General
Code Section 4227-12 which provided that certain foregoing sec-
tions of the General Code relating to the initiative and referendum
should be inapplicable to any municipality operating under a home
rule charter containing provisions for the initiative and referendum.
It was claimed that the classification of municipalities into charter
and non-charter units was prohibited by Article H, Section 26. The
ready answer to this objection, as the court indicated, is that the
very classification in question is recognized by the constitution.
(c) Geographical classification.
Geographical classification was upheld in Board of Health v.
Greenville.46 Section 1249 et seq., General Code, authorized the
state board of health to take certain action in connection with
sewage, including requiring the construction and operation of sew-
age purification plants. It was further provided that no city or
village which is discharging sewage47 into any river which separates
Ohio from another state (the court judically noticed that this applied
only to the Ohio River) would be required to install sewage puri-
fication plants as long as unpurified sewage of cities and villages
of any other state is discharged into the river above the Ohio city
or village.
The geographical classification affected by this proviso was
the basis of an asserted violation of Article II, Section 26. The court
upheld the classification. It would have been quite futile to have
compelled those located upon the Ohio side of the Ohio river to re-
frain from pollution of the stream when it was being polluted by
those on the other bank who were quite beyond the reach of the
Ohio legislature. The sound basis for the decision was that the
statute did operate as uniformly as the nature of the subject mat-
ter permitted. The court also pointed out that the class was an
open one.
There is further authority to support the view that geographical
classification is permissible in Ohio. In State ex rel. Squire v.
Cleveland4s the court had before it a statute relating to "[a]ll
municipal corporations within the corporate limits of which there is
or may hereafter be included part of the shore of the waters of
Lake Erie. ' 49 Another section of the statute excepted Cleveland
from the operation of its general provisions.50 The trial court be-
45 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 606 (1927).
46 S6 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).
47 The OHIo GEN. CODE provision read "is discharging sewage" whereas the
Act of April 7, 1908 read "is now discharging sewage."
4S 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E. 2d 709 (1948).
49 Omo Gr. CODE § 3699-1.50Oio GEN. CoDE § 3699-8.
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lieved that the excepting provision invalidated the entire act on
the ground that this particular section could not be dropped and
the act extended to cover Cleveland because the legislature did
not intend to include Cleveland and the court had no power to do
so. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court
and held that the statute, aside from the excepting provision, was
valid. This was determined on the basis that the provision ap-
plicable only to Cleveland was merely a limitation on the territorial
operation of the act and was, therefore, separable under the separ-
ability clause. Judge Stewart, who wrote the opinion for the su-
preme court, thought that the whole act was invalid under Article
II, Section 26. Since, however, more than one of the members of
the supreme court agreed on the theory propounded by the court
of appeals that view prevailedsoa The element of "naturalness" in-
herent in a geographical classification is a strong basis for uphold-
ing it. It is also readily apparent that a statute such as the one
considered in the Squire case would have no applicability to other
than littoral lands no matter how generally it was drafted.
The court's treatment of the provision excepting Cleveland
from the operation of the statute is particularly interesting. It
could have said that the excepting provision was invalid but to dis-
regard it would result in applying the statute where the legislature
had forbidden so the whole enactment must fall. Instead, the op-
posite result was achieved with an appropriate show of deference
to the legislature.
In Greenville v. Board of Health,51 and in other cases, the court
has been asked, in the event that an exception to a general statute
shall be found to be unconstitutional, to disregard the exception
and to apply the statute uniformly throughout the state. The court
has consistently refused to accede on the ground that such action
would invade the province of the general assembly in extending
the operation of the statute in a manner expressly forbidden by
the general assembly. The result of this view has been that where
the exception is held invalid the whole statute falls with it. There
is no disposition to underestimate the drastic effect of a holding of
unconstitutionality. There must be, however, certain self-imposed
judical restraints when a statute is subjected to review and the
one which refuses to extend a statute where the legislature has for-
bidden is based upon the most sound considerations of deference
due a coordinate branch of the government.
B. Comm~s
In Andrews v. State ex rel. Henry5 2 a statute providing for
50a OrIo CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 2.
S 86 Ohio St 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).
52 104 Ohio St. 384, 135 N.E. 655 (1922).
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bonds in criminal cases, in fact limited only to Cuyahoga County,
was invalidated under Article II, Section 26. Judge Wanamaker,
speaking for a unanimous court, strongly intimated that a classi-
fication of Cuyahoga County along with the other larger counties
would be a reasonable one. It appears to the writer that there are
no sound reasons which require county population classification
to be more suspect than similar classification applied to munici-
palities. The fire prevention problem, for example, of counties con-
taining organized areas would be roughly similar to one another
and substantially different from predominantly rural counties.
County libraries are the subject of general legislation in Ohio.
A statute concerning the establishment of libraries in general terms
but actually applicable only to Hamilton County has been in-
validated as contrary to Article II, Section 26.53 The court thought
that it was obvious that libraries could only be the proper subjects
of general laws because knowledge was not more necessary or de-
sirable in one part of the state than in another.
The problems arising under the general laws provision of the
constitution have been far less acute in relation to counties than
to municipalities. The Ohio Supreme Court has not treated counties
in a significantly different manner from cities. Of course, there is
no constitutional classification of counties.
C. SCHooLs
By Article I, Section 7, of the constitution the legislature is
exhorted to encourage schools. The cases reveal that the encour-
agement must be by general laws.
In Minshafl v. State ex rel. Merritt 54 the court examined that
provision of Ohio General Code Section 7749-1 which required a
district board of education to furnish transportation for high school
students when the county board of education so determined. There
was no difficulty in upholding the statute in view of the express
exception in Article II, Section 26, which allows statutes relating
to the public schools to take effect upon the approval of an au-
thority other than the General Assembly.
On April 2, 1902 the legislature passed an act establishing a
special school district in parts of two counties. Quo warranto was
brought to test its validity and, in State ex rel. v. Spellmire,55 the
court discussed the relevant cases in the course of holding the act
invalid under Article II, Section 26. The court overruled the
Shearer case,5 6 which had stated the rule that special legislation
S3 Brown v. State ecx rel. Merland, 120 Ohio St. 297, 166 N.E. 214 (1929).
s4 124 Ohio St. 61, 176 N.E. 888 (1931).
55 67 Ohio St. 77, 65 N.E. 619 (1902).
56 46 Ohio St. 275, 21 N.E. 354 (1889). This resulted in reinstating State
v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54 (1882) which had previously been overruled by the
Shearer case.
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was not prohibited as applied to subject matter local in nature such
as schools. It was the view of Chief Justice Burket, speaking for
a unanimous court, that there was no constitutional justification
for the Shearer doctrine "of carving a special or local subject-mat-
ter out of one of a general nature.5 7 The reversal was based on the
purely logical grounds that no exception is expressed in Section
26. It had been argued for the defendants that an adverse decision
might well jeopardize other school districts. Judgment of ouster
was granted and the court emphasized that the judgment could be
drawn so as to "protect the public interests."5 8
In Cline v. Martin9 the court upheld the validity of a statute
which conferred authority on county boards of education to change
school district lines in order to facilitate accessibility for all stu-
dents served by the school. The charge of specialism deserved no
more from the court than the statement that this was "undoubted-
ly" a law of a general nature which operated uniformly through-
out the state.
D. TAXATION
In the taxation field we find, as we have in other areas, that
the law as to the requirements of generality was well-established
and then, after the lapse of years, the earlier decisions were re-
jected. It was once settled that a tax collector could be appointed
for certain designated counties. 60 The rationale was that tax col-
lection was clearly a matter of a local nature. The present rule is
that the subject is of a general nature and that statutes concerning
it must be of uniform operation throughout the state.61
In Davis v. Wiemeyer6 2 the court was confronted with the prob-
lem of the constitutionality of a statute which authorized, as to
some property owners only, the assessment of real estate accord-
ing to benefit received in the construction of a state highway.63 The
legislature attempted to authorize the county commissioners of
counties having a tax duplicate of at least a certain amount to
assess part of the cost against specially-benefited property owners.
No such authorization was made as to those counties having a
lesser tax duplicate. Judge Robinson, speaking for a unanimous
court, said that the law was of a general nature and, therefore, was
required to operate uniformly throughout the state. The court then
proceeded to determine that the classification of property owners
57 67 Ohio St. 77, 89, 65 N.E. 619, 623 (1902).
58 Id. at 90, 65 N. at 623.
59 94 Ohio St. 420, 115 N.E. 37 (1916).60 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Crites, 48 Ohio St. 142, 26 N.E. 1052 (1891);
State ex rel. Ogelvee v. Capeller, 39 Ohio St 207 (1883).
61 State ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis, 74 Ohio St. 403, 78 N.E. 523 (1906).
62 124 Ohio St. 103, 177 N.E. 37 (1931).
63 OHIO GEN. CODE § 1193.
[Vol. 11
GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES
for purposes of assessment was unreasonable because the value of
the tax duplicate of a county has no necessary relation to special
benefit to a property owner. The opinion did not indicate that a
classification of counties as to the value of tax duplicate would be
banned by Article I, Section 26, for other purposes. The writer
suggests that the court is to be commended for frankly examining
the relationship between the classification utilized and the benefit
conferred by the construction of the highway. In many instances
the validity of the classification can be properly appraised only by
examining its relation to the rest of the statute.
Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides that
the legislature "shall make," by taxation or otherwise, provision
which "will secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state." Section 7575, General Code, pur-
suant to the mandate, provided for a property tax levy equally
throughout the state and for distribution of the proceeds to school
districts according to need. In Miller v. Korns 64 the statute was at-
tacked as contrary to both Article I, Section 26, and Article XII,
Section 2, which provides for ad valorem taxation by uniform rule.
The court said that the latter requirement was met by the tax be-
ing imposed equally on all property throughout the state and that
unequal distribution of the proceeds was necessary to meet the
constitutional requirement of an efficient school system. Of course,
the argument of violation of Article II, Section 26, received short
shrift in view of the provision relating to the establishment of an
efficient school system throughout the state. There is no doubt that
the court reached the correct result.
In State ex rel. Brunenkant v. Wallace,6 5 Ohio General Code
Sections 6290, and 6291, were attacked on the ground that uni-
formity was lacking because trackless trolleys were excluded
from the definition of motor vehicle for the purposes of the annual
license tax on motor vehicles. The court held that Article I1, Sec-
tion 26, was not violated by this statute as it operated uniformly on
a territorial basis and applied equally to all persons and property
intended to be brought within its operation. It appears to the writ-
er that a different decision would have resulted in depriving the
legislature of its discretion and policy-making power in the field of
taxation. This would be an improper result in view of the well-
settled power of the legislature to select the subjects and persons,
within broad limits, to which a given tax will be made to apply.
The statute under consideration amounted merely to a legislative
determination that trackless trolleys would not be classified with
motor vehicles in general for purposes of taxation.
64107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923).
65137 Ohio St. 379, 30 N.E. 2d 696 (1940).
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There is reason to believe that classification in taxation statutes
will be upheld so long as fundamental tenets of fair play are not
violated. In other words, where there is only a difference of op-
inion as to the propriety of the classification under consideration
the court is not likely to invalidate the statute. This is but another
example of the due regard which most courts have today for the
exigencies of a sound tax-gathering system. The flow of revenue
will not be hampered except when there are clear violations of
constitutional mandates. 66
E. Ptm.c WoRKs
The judicial treatment of the requirement of generality in
statutes concerning public works has been variant. The initial
Ohio view was set forth in a case where mandamus was asked to
compel the commissioners of a particular county to act under a
statute directing them to improve a particular road within the
county.6 7 The writ was allowed and the court brushed aside the
argument that the statute violated the general laws provision by
saying, "this provision does not affect the power of the legislature
to pass local laws where the acts are in their nature local." 68 The
other possible mode of treating the problem, that is, denominating
roads a subject of general legislation and so one requiring uniform
treatment throughout the state, did not initially win the court's
support.
In Hixson v. Burson69 the court had before it a statute which
authorized any county having a population between 35,190 and
35,200 to construct roads within the county under certain con-
ditions. The act applied actually only to Athens County. The court
said that the statute was clearly a local one and the problem pre-
sented was whether the subject of roads was general in nature.
After an elaborate discussion the court concluded that, "[i]t seems
so clear that the subject of roads is of a general nature, that we
would be doing violence to our oaths to hold otherwise" 70 and pro-
ceeded to overrule the inconsistent holding in the earlier case.
The rule as to highways enunciated by Hixson v. Burson was
soon extended to bridges. 71 In the face of a general law concerning
6 6 This view was recently demonstrated in Angell v. City of Toledo, 153
Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250 (1950) where the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought
the invalidation of the Toledo municipal income tax on constitutional grounds.
The court was not impressed by dicta in an earlier case which supported
plaintiffs position.
67 State ex rel. Hibbs v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 35 Ohio St.
458 (1880).
68 Id. at 467.
69 54 Ohio St. 470, 43 N.E. 1000 (1896).
70 Id. at 485, 43 NE. at 1003.
71 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Davis, 55 Ohio St. 15, 44 N.E. 511 (1895).
[Vol. 11
GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES
the construction of bridges the legislature passed an abortive spe-
cial statute dealing with bridges in Mahoning County. The ex-
istence of the general statute on bridges appeared to be a sub-
stantial factor in the holding that bridges were only appropriate
subjects for general legislation. Where there is an operative gen-
eral statute dealing with a subject, it should certainly receive
judical consideration in the determination of the generality of the
subject matter.
In Thorniley v. State ex rel. Dickey,72 the court approved and
followed the Hixson case and State ex rel. Attorney General v.
DavIs73 in the course of holding Section 4903 of the Revised Statutes
unconstitutional. The statute was deemed to be repugnant to the
generality requirement of the constitution in that it was an es-
sential part of a statute making different provision for the manage-
ment of highways in different counties of the state. No rational
basis was discovered for the differentiation in treatment and it was
noted that the counties to which the special legislation applied were
the most, as well as the least, populous in the state. The invalidated
section itself only related to the compensation of county commis-
sioners for services rendered as highway directors and the same
result could have been reached by holding that it was repealed by
a later inconsistent statute which specified the salaries of county
commissioners and limited their salaries to such amount.74
The Hixson case substantially represents the Ohio rule today.
It appears that the rule is sound in two important respects: (1) It
closes a loophole in the constitutional requirement of general leg-
islation. The loophole amounted to saying that a bridge or a road
was localized in a particular area of the state and could, therefore,
be dealt with by special or local legislation. It is believed that
this was nothing more than a play on words. (2) As a practical
matter it has been shown that general laws are most efficacious in
the public works field. It would be difficult to show any defects
of the present system comparable to the log-rolling which was pre-
valent under the old system of special legislation.
It appears that logic alone has not proven an unerring guide
in this area. The modern Ohio law has come into existence after
the court has had full opportunity to appraise the working results
of both special and general legislation in the field. The courts'
resolution of the problem purports to have discovered the key to
what the constitution really means. The writer suggests, however,
that what the court has really done is to resolve a question of leg-
islative policy in much the same manner that the legislature would
72 81 Ohio St. 108, 90 N.E. 144 (1909).
73 55 Ohio St. 15, 44 N.E. 511 (1896).
74 Act of April 21, 1904.
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do if it had the power. The court has decided that general statutes
are probably better in the public works area. In other words, the
court originally determined that the legislative decision to use
special laws was reasonable and now only general laws on this
subject are so held.
F. EECTiONS.
Statutes providing for and regulating primary elections have
been unsuccessfully attacked as contrary to the general laws pro-
vision.75 The permissive primary election applied only to those
parties which cast at least ten per centum of the vote at the last
general election but this was not held to be an unreasonable classi-
fication. In the same case it was determined that the existence of
special primary election statutes in three counties of the state did
not prevent the general statute from operating uniformly through-
out the state as no geographical restrictions were imposed upon it. 76
In State ex rel. Wilmot v. Buckley77 the court passed on a
statute concerning election boards which specifically exempted
Mansfield and cities of the fourth grade of the first class from its
operation. There was no difficulty in finding that the act was vio-
lative of the uniformity requirement of Article II, Seection 26. In
answer to the argument that the exceptions should be disregarded
and the legislation applied uniformly, the court replied that there
was a difference between an exception and a limitation and that
this was an exception and the court had no power to extend the act
where the legislature had forbidden. The case is also noteworthy
for an interesting dictum to the effect that the old election statute
contained a valid classification as far as cities went but that there
was no authority to classify counties as to elections.78 There was
little indication as to why counties should be treated differently in
this respect.
In Gentsch v. State ex rel. McGorray79 the court upheld Re-
vised Statutes Section 2926o which provided that in all cities of a
population of 300,000 or more or which later attained such a popu-
lation the polls should be open on election day from five-thirty
o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the afternoon. Section
2926a provided that the polls should close at 5:30 in the afternoon
in all other cities where registration was required. Only Cincinnati
and Cleveland would be required to close their polls at four o'clock
at the time of the decision but the court was impressed by the
open-end character of the classification. The reasonableness of the
75 State ex tel. Webber v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85 (1908).
76 Id. at 579, 84 N.E. at 90.
77 60 Ohio St. 273, 54 N.E. 272 (1899).
78 Id. at 297, 54 N.E. at 276.
79 71 Ohio St. 151, 72 N.E. 900 (1904).
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classification was approved on the ground that fraud was more
likely to occur in large cities under cover of darkness. The court
concluded that the statute was general and operated uniformly
within the requirements of Article II, Section 26. There appears
to be no doubt but that the classification was as wide as the evil
to be corrected and this should be enough.
State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller ° upheld an act passed by
the legislature to provide for the election of judges by separate
non-partisan ballot. The decision was by a three-to-two vote and
was characterized by sharp dissenting opinions based on the stated
improper treatment of illiterate voters. Judge Donahue, writing
for the majority gave only brief attention to the claim of invalidity
under Article II, Section 26, and disposed of it on the grounds that
the legislature had power to treat elections for different types of
offices differently. The result was buttressed by an extended dis-
cussion of the requirements for judicial office in contrast to those
for legislative and executive positions. The majority opinion also
pointed out that separate ballots were not previously unknown in
Ohio. At this writing there is nothing surprising about the de-
cision because of the contemporary widespread use of the separate
non-political judical ballot.81
G. MISC.LLANEOUS
1. Crime
Laws defining crimes and prescribing punishment therefor
must comply with the general laws provision.8 2
2. Jury Trial
A statute imposing certain restrictions on the right to trial by
jury in "all counties which now contain, or which may contain a
city of the second grade of the first class" was invalidated in Silber-
man v. Hays3 as contrary to the general laws provision. The "classi-
fication" was applicable only to Cuyahoga County and the court
stated that no subject was more clearly of a general nature than
the basic right to trial by jury. Judge Minshall carefully dis-
tinguished the facts under consideration from those in an earlier
S0 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N.E. 1078 (1912).
SI It is noteworthy that at the time of the decision in the Miller case the
provision of Article IV, Section 2 requiring more than a majority vote in the
supreme court to hold a law unconstitutional had been adopted but was not
yet effective. Judge Donahue said, "The fact that it has been adopted shows
that the people of this state are of the opinion that courts have been too ready
to find constitutional objection to legislation." Id. at 30, 99 N.E. at 1080.
8 2 In Ex Parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638 (1885) it was held that a statute
purporting to make it a crime to be found in or near a certain city with
burglar's tools was invalid as contrary to the general laws provision.
83 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 N.E. 258 (1899).
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case which upheld a mode of selecting jurors in Cuyahoga County
differently from the provision made under the general law.8 4 It is
doubtful whether such a statute would be upheld today.
3. Personal Property.
Statutes which classified beer bottles and similar containers
separately from other personal property have been held to be gen-
eral statutes with the requisite uniform operation throughout the
state.85 In reaching this result the court was careful to point out
that containers of the type under consideration were different from
other personal property in that their normal use required them to
be temporarily in the possession of the purchaser of their contents.
The owner of the container customarily had his trade name or
mark blown into the bottle.
4. Relief
In State ex rel. De Woody v. Bixler86 the court examined a
statute which permitted county commissioners, by a two-thirds
vote, to establish a poor relief distributing fund and which re-
quired them to take such action when requested by resolution of
a taxing authority administering relief within the county.87 The
statute was upheld against an attack under that provision of Article
II, Section 26, which declares that no act, except those relating to
public schools, shall be passed "to take effect upon the approval of
any other authority than the General Assembly . . ." Judge
Williams, writing for a unanimous court, said that the county com-
missioners were, at most, required to make a factual determination.
The decision is in accord with the modern view that the legislature
may delegate the power to make determinations of fact.
5. Trust Companies
Legislation purporting to authorize probate courts in some
counties only to appoint trust companies to act as administrators
of decedents' estates has been invalidated as contrary to the gen-
eral laws provision.8 8 It is not believed that the decision would
preclude general legislation in the field.
H. EVALUATmON
The crucial test of the workability of population classifications
is usually found in their application to municipalities. As has al-
ready been indicated, the Ohio pattern of two population groupings
for all municipalities would result in severe hardship were it not
84 McGill v State, 34 Ohio St. 228 (1878).
85 Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N.E. 118 (1917).
86 136 Ohio St. 263, 25 N.. 2d 341 (1940).
87 OHIO GEN. CODE § 6309-2.
88 Schumacher v. McCallip, 69 Ohio St. 500, 69 N.E. 986 (1904).
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for the existence of substantive home rule powers for municipal-
ities.s9
Classification of municipalities into broad and substantial
population groups is widely upheld even though there may be
many more groups than are permitted under the Ohio Constitution.
Such classification finds zeady judical acceptance even though
there may be wide factual divergences within cities of the same
general size.90 The reason for the popularity of population group-
ings is probably that such classification involves general similarity
within the class in respect to population which, in turn, is thought
to have at least some relevance to the character and scope of many
municipal problems. It is true that large metropolitan areas have
serious problems in connection with crime prevention, for example,
which are not found in rural areas. It is very doubtful, however,
that there is as complete similarity as might be expected in regard
to particular types of municipal activities, such as the need for
fire or police protection, within cities of the same population
group.9' It is thought that these considerations do not tend to de-
stroy the validity of population classification. After all, the pur-
pose of the constitutional provisions is to prevent the abuses of spe-
cial legislation for each municipality. Even though population
groupings are rather rough and ready, they are sufficiently remov-
ed from specialism to justify validation. Of course, the judiciary
should not approve merely sham classification.
While population groupings provide only a general guide to
municipal similarities, practical considerations are strongly in their
favor. It would be well-nigh an impossible task to draft a statute
with base classifications which take account of almost every point
of difference and which, at the same time, do not constitute spe-
cialism in fact under the guise of classification.
Germaneness of the population classification to the purpose of
the law should be a factor which receives careful judical consider-
ation. The population classification should have some real bearing
on the problem at hand.92 An established population classification
should be used where appropriate, but it should not be utilized to
prevent geographical classification, for example, when only such
See note 44 supra.
'O See the cases cited in 2 SUTEWRLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2109
(3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
91 For a study of the lack of relation between population and area and
various other factors see Horack and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another
Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L. J. 109, 183, 184-186 (1936).
92 See, e.g., State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807,
184 S.W. 2d 593 (1945) which upheld a population classification related to fire
protection purposes even though St. Louis County was the only one ip the
class.
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classification can give coherence to a law. It is believed that the
Ohio court has been wise to uphold geographical classification as
in accord with realities even though it finds no express sanction in
the constitution.
The courts frequently test population classification by de-
termining whether it is "open-end" so that the subjects of the law
can move from one class to another as populations change. Stated
negatively, frozen population classifications (which are frequently
limited to a particular census) are invalid. This writer believes
that it is entirely proper to require classifications to be fluid. Other-
wise, the degree of artificiality present in the classification is likely
to increase proportionately to the time the classes have been frozen.
It should at least be required of population classes that they
accurately reflect population as of the present time.
The Ohio cases have generally stated uniformity of operation
to be a separate requirement. Frequently the subject matter of the
statute will be determined to be of a general nature and then the
statute will be invalidated on the ground that it fails to have a
uniform operation throughout the state. It is believed that this
is merely a roundabout method of saying that the statute is special
and the constitution requires it to be general, so it must fall. If a
statute particularizes within a possible and practical general class-
ification it is special law. A statute is a general one if it applies
equally to all those within the classification it establishes. If the
classification is unreasonable the statute can either be invalidated
on due process grounds or because the classification is not suf-
ficiently related to the subject matter of the legislation. The Ohio
court's frequent reference to "uniform operation throughout the
State" is understandable because, after all, the language does
appear in the constitution. It is far, however, from constituting
a solving concept.9 3
Curative Statutes
The problem of generality as opposed to specialism also arises
in connection with curative and retroactive legislation. The partic-
93 Some cases illustrate a realistic use of the uniformity provision:
In State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E. 2d 219 (1941)
the court upheld the validity of a statute requiring city fire departments to
meet certain minimum standards. The opinion briefly considered the claim
that the statute lacked uniform operation in that it applied only to cities and
dismissed it on the grounds that the constitution recognized reasonable classi-
fications including the classifications of cities and villages.
In State ex rel. Outcalt v. Guckenberger, 134 Ohio St. 457, 17 N.E. 2d 743
(1938), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Whittemore Acts which,
in the period of the depression, remitted penalties and interest on taxes as
an inducement to payment. The court specifically stated that the uniformity
provision of Article H, Section 26 was not violated as the questioned statutes
operated equally upon persons and property similarly situated.
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ular problems raised under the Ohio constitutional provision are,
however, sufficiently different from the problems thus far covered
in this paper to justify separate treatment. It may be helpful at
the outset to suggest definitions of the kind of legislation under
consideration. A curative (or validating) statute, most simply
viewed, is one designed to cure legal defects in either prior acts
or prior legislation or in both. Such a statute is usually a retro-
active one. A retroactive (or retrospective) statute is one which
affects acts or legal relations existing before the statute came into
operation.
In addition to the provision forbidding the impairment of
contracts, which is beyond the scope of this article, Article II,
Section 28, of the Ohio Constitution contains both a flat prohibition
and a limited authorization. The first clause in the section states
that "[t]he General Assembly shall have no power to pass retro-
active laws." This has been held to constitute a flat prohibition
of such laws.9 4 The third portion of the section, the significant one
for purposes of this discussion, provides that the legislature may,
"by general laws" authorize courts to effectuate on equitable terms
"the manifest intention of parties, and officers, by curing omissions,
defects and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of
their want of conformity with the laws of this State."
Curative statutes are usually plainly retroactive in effect, so
the provision just quoted may be treated as an exception to the
broad prohibition against retroactive laws found in the same article
of the constitution. Is there anything which requires curative legis-
lation to be only retroactive in operation? The constitutional pro-
vision itself, of course, contemplates the effectuation of prior acts.
However, this is not to specify the method by which such acts
are to be effectuated. A careful reading of the provision fails to
reveal an express interdiction of prospective or open-end curative
statutes. There is no reason why a statute drafted to effectuate
acts, insufficient or defective in themselves, occuring in the future
would not meet the literal language of the constitution. The re-
quirement that the effectuation be by means of general laws seems
to add considerable strength to the conclusion that "open-end"
legislation is desirable. Indeed, as we have already seen, there
is much authority which indicates that such prospective character
is essential to the validity of a general law.
What arguments can be mustered to oppose general and pros-
pective curative legislation? Such a question requires analysis of
the practical and common-sense reasons behind a constitutional
,)4 Safford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 Ohio St. 332, 164 N.E. 351
(1928). The prohibition against retroactive laws does not include those of
a procedural or remedial nature. State ex rel. Slaughter v. Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio, 132 Ohio St. 537, 9 N.E. 2d 505 (1937).
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authorization of curative legislation. One substantial policy basis
is the recognition that a substantial portion of state and local bus-
iness is conducted by laymen unfamiliar with legal intricacies.
It is believed that the logic behind the constitutional provision is
that where there are policy reasons to effectuate otherwise legally
unmeaningful acts that the legislature should have specific au-
thorization in the constitution to carry such acts into effect. The
legislature will determine whether the conditions which exist and
the acts which have been done are entitled to validation. Whether
the legislature bases its policy determination on the good faith
and substantial compliance with the law by the parties or officials
or on the necessity of avoiding undesirable consequences or un-
certainty where the legally inadequate action has been relied upon
is unimportant so long as the legislative effectuation is on such
terms, according to the constitutional wording, "as shall be just
and equitable."
Would the fundamental policy enunciated be undermined by
a general law operating prospectively which undertook to validate
future deficient acts which were based upon a prescribed degree
of compliance with other existing law or upon the presence of good
faith on the part of some or all of the parties? This question would
be almost instantly met by the objection that such a law would
encourage disregard of the law generally on the assumption that
all, or at least many, defects would be automatically cured by
the suggested general and prospective curative statute. To state
such an objection is to acknowledge its merit. Such a course of
conduct would perhaps be unwise for a legislature to follow. Even
so, it is doubtful whether unwisdom alone would answer the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of such a measure. As a matter of law
such a statute would amount to nothing more than a legislative
declaration that the law shall not be so strict in reference to those
matters capable of validation under the prospective curative statute.
It should not be forgotten that we are interpreting a constitutional
requirement that curative laws be general ones. Whatever might be
a court's view as to the wisdom of an "open-end" curative statute,
it is submitted that there would be no proper occasion for the use
of the drastic step of a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality.
It has not been the purpose of the foregoing discussion to
suggest that "closed" curative statutes are invalid. The purpose
has been, rather, to explore fully the considerations relevent to
"open-end" curative statutes. In view of the plain requirement
that curative laws must be general laws, a fundamental question
in connection with the validity of "closed" curative statutes is
whether such a statute with a "frozen" classification can qualify
as a general law. As applied to municipalities such classification
[Vol. 11
GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES
based on population would clearly be invalid under Article XVIII,
Section 1, which requires "transition" from the one class to the
other. Different considerations, however, may be relevant when a
"closed" basis of operation is employed in curative legislation. The
problem here is whether past acts can constitute a reasonable basis
for the operation of curative legislation. Suppose, for example,
that a statute passed in 1949 ordains that all persons who were the
victims of torts committed by the state between 1943 and 1947
should be awarded damages in a prescribed manner. Is the stated
period of time a reasonable basis for the operation of the legis-
lation? Stated differently, is the basis so unreasonable as to warrant
invalidation? Probably the statute is inadequate if there is no
other provision made for those similarly situated who were vic-
timized before 1943 and after 1947. But this is a far cry from
deeming it unreasonable. Standards of reasonableness lack precision
and in this situation, where the time period is assumed to have
some relation to the injuries suffered, it seems proper to uphold
the legislative determination. Further support for this view can be
found in the legislature's acknowledged policy power in respect
to curative statutes. The legislature determines initially whether
a particular subject matter can be appropriately dealt with by a
curative statute and, within certain broad limits, it should have
the power to prescribe the operative time, including the beginning
and terminal dates, of curative legislation enacted. As a practical
matter in Ohio there should be no question as to the validity of
"frozen" curative legislation because the Ohio Supreme Court
has actually gone so far as to uphold special curative legislation
which is applicable only to a past event and to one named indi-
vidual.95
In Spitzig v. State ex rel. Hile96 a special statute based on a
personal injury fact background was presented to the court. One
Spitzig was summoned as a juror and while so acting and in the
absence of negligence on his part was injured due to the falling
of a courthouse elevator. The legislature passed a special statute
authorizing the county commissioners of Cuyahoga to pay the
victim a sum not exceeding $15,000. A taxpayer sued to enjoin the
payment of $12,500, which sum had been set pursuant to the
terms of the statute. The court emphasized that it had only the
constitutional question to decide.
Judge Kinkade, who wrote for the unanimous court which
upheld the validity of the statute, appeared to reason in the follow-
ing manner: (1) The facts were undisputed. (2) The legislature
found that the injury to Spitzig imposed a moral obligation on the
95 See note 96 infra.
96 119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394 (1928).
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state. (3) The payment of $12,500 was only compensation and was
in no sense a gratuity extended by the county to Spitzig.' ' 97 (4)
The special statute did not violate the state constitution because
where the state acknowledges a moral obligation the prohibition
of retroactive laws found in Article II, Section 28, is inapplicable.
(5) Although the moral obligation does not amount to a legal
one, it is "unthinkable" that the state be powerless to act in the
premises.
Implicit in the holding that Article II, Section 26, also was in-
applicable was the determination that the statute in question was a
law of a special nature. Aside from the implication just mentioned,
the court repeatedly referred to the statute as a special one. How
then did it overcome the obstacle presented by the general law re-
quirement of Article II, Section 28? The writer is unable to answer
this question other than to say it appears that the court simply
ignored the requirement. The conclusion that the payment to Spit-
zig was compensation rather than gratuity may be questionable in
view of the legislative finding of only a moral obligation resting
upon the state. In any event, the legislature did formulate the
policy that Spitzig should be paid. It is quite clear that the court's
view that the statute was special was correct because it applied
only to Spitzig. Certainly it was retroactive in operation and basing
it upon a moral obligation, without more, does not render the
general law requirement inapplicable. It is submitted that there
is no sound reason for the court's validation of special legislation,
once the legislature has found a moral obligation, in the face of
the contrary unequivocal constitutional mandate. It will not do to
rationalize the result in terms of some inarticulate judicial feeling
that general legislation would not be applicable to the fact situ-
ation; such an argument does not apply to the Ohio Constitution.
Even though one rebels against the conception of public irrespon-
sibility present in the concept of sovereign immunity from tort
liability, it is well to recognize that the constitution provides a means
to accomplish the laudable objective which the legislature had in
providing for Spitzig's relief. A general statute passed for the relief
of all those now or later situated similarly to Spitzig would comply
with the requirements of Article II, Section 28.
It is frequently said that a legislature cannot do by a validating
act that which was originally beyond its power. The Ohio general
assembly once attempted to provide that special school districts
previously invalidated would become valid special school districts
under the provisions of a validating act.98 The court struck down
the supposed validating act without hesitation and said that the
97 Id. at 120, 162 N.E. at 395.98Bartlett v. State, 73 Ohio St. 54, 75 N.E. 939 (1905).
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legislature's power "to validate any void or ineffectual act is lim-
ited to such acts as it might have originally performed or author-
ized. 9
It is essential that the curative statute be worded sufficiently
broadly to remedy the defect which the legislature intends to
reach. In one case failure to advertise for bids pursuant to the
requirement of an existing statute was not validated by a later
statute which purported to cure the defect because the later statute
was carelessly drawn too narrowly.100
In Kumler v. Silsbee'01 the court had before it a statute which
provided that where any municipal corporation previously had
granted by ordinance the right to lay pipes and drains below the
surface of its streets that such ordinance should be held valid and
binding as if the municipality had had express authority so to
grant. The claims were made that the statute was unconstitutional
because it was retroactive and so violated Article I, Section 28,
and because it was a special grant of corporate power and so vio-
lated Article 13, Section 1. The court held that the act, as a curative
one, was within that exception to the prohibition against retroactive
laws. Without extended discussion the court held the statute to
be general. It is implicit in the opinion that curative acts must
be general.
Curative acts are a valuable legislative tool to help smooth
the administration of government and to prevent wrongs from going
without effective legal remedies. The requirement of the Ohio
Constitution that such acts must be general is entirely workable
and the courts should see that purported curative legislation meets
the constitutional test.
Express Prohibitions on Special Legislation
Article II, Section 32, put an end to legislative divorces in
Ohio.102
The leading case for our purposes on Article XIII, Section 1,
which as we have seen forbids special acts conferring corporate
power, is the Cincinnati Hospital case which was discussed earlier
in this article. 0 3 In this case the court held void a statute which
attempted to confer corporate power on a named municipally-
owned hospital. The case shows that even though this constitutional
provision is frequently thought of in connection with private cor-
09 Id. at 57, 75 NX. at 940.
100 Cowen v. State ex rel. Donovan, 101 Ohio St. 387, 129 N.E. 719 (1920).
10138 Ohio St 445 (1882).
102 For the background of legislative divorces in Ohio see Woodbridge,
A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law,
13 U. oF Cnm. L.. 191, 251-255 (1939).
10 3 See note 34 supra.
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porations, it can also apply to municipal corporations.1°4
Requirements or Authorizations of Special Legislation
The implicit requirement of specialism for the creation of new
counties and for certain other purposes has already been men-
tioned. 0 S
Article IV, Section 1, of the Ohio Constitution provides that
the judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts
of appeals, courts of common pleas, courts of probate, and such
other courts inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to
time be established by law.
In Kelley v. State0 6 the court considered a statute of April 9,
1856 which conferred certain criminal jurisdiction on some of the
common pleas courts of the state and not on others. By a three-
to-two decision the court determined that the courts -of common
pleas in Ohio were an organization of a general nature and that
the laws dealing with them must, therefore, be of a general nature.
It was also stated that these laws "are imperatively required to
have a uniform operation throughout the state."'0 7 The reasoning
of the court was mechanical but the decision effectively prevented
special legislation applicable to the lower courts.
In Wallace v. Leiter'0 8 a statute which provided that there
should be an appeal in certain counties from the probate court to
the circuit court in specified cases was invalidated as a general
law not having uniform operation. In a brief opinion the court
stated its reliance on the well settled rule of the Kelley case.
In two interesting cases the court examined legislation dealing
with probate courts. In the first case, Squire, Superintendent of
Banks, v. Bates,0 9 the court invalidated Ohio General Code Sec-
tion 10501-62, which provided for divergent methods of appeal
from probate courts. The statutory method provided that in in-
stances where the probate judge had the qualifications prescribed
by law for common pleas judges, appeal was taken directly to the
court of appeals. In other instances the appeal was to the common
pleas court. Judge Zimmerman, speaking for a unanimous court,
stressed that the result of the method was to make appeals de-
pendent upon the qualifications of the particular probate judge.
The opinion stated that because the statute concerned the appellate
104 In a leading case the trial court thought that if the questioned statutes
were not invalid as contrary to the general laws provision that they should
fall under Article X=I, Section 1. State eX Tel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio
St. 303, 82 N.E. 2d 709 (1948).
10S See page 464 supra.
106 6 Ohio St. 269 (1856).
107 Id. at 272.
108 76 Ohio St. 185, 81 N.E. 187 (1907).
109 132 Ohio St. 161, 5 N.E. 2d 690 (1936).
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jurisdiction of two constitutional courts that it was a law of a
general nature and failed to have the requisite uniform operation.
In re Estate of Bates"0 presented a situation readily distin-
guishable from the foregoing one. Section 10501-56, General Code,
provided that when a record was not made at the hearing of a
matter before the probate court, an appeal on law and fact may
be taken to the common pleas court. Judge Matthias, writing for
the unanimous court, emphasized that the legislation merely
provided an optional method of procedure. The argument that
the statute was invalid as not having uniform operation was based
on the fact that some probate courts were combined with common
pleas courts and that therefore the statute only applied to probate
courts as such. The court readily conceded that this was the situ-
ation but apparently thought that the classification of probate
courts which were not combined with common pleas courts was
a reasonable one. The statute applied only to appeal proceedings
and applied uniformly to separate probate courts throughout the
state. It is clear that so long as some probate courts are combined
with common pleas courts and are known as "common pleas courts"
and the others are separate and are known as "probate courts" that
it is entirely proper to treat the latter as a separate class for such
purposes as appeal to the common pleas courts. It would, of course,
be ridiculous to allow such an appeal for the former class as it
would result in an appeal taken from a court to the same court.
The reader will have noted that all the cases dealing with
courts which have been discussed thus far have been concerned
with the constitutional courts enumerated in Article IV, Section 1.
This provision of the constitution also refers to "such other courts
inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to time be es-
tablished by law." This is interpreted to refer to laws passed by
the legislature; the power to establish courts is held to be beyond
the home rule powers of municipalities.11 1 The uniformity re-
quirement of Article II, Section 26, is regarded as inapplicable to
the creation of inferior courts and the general assembly has com-
monly created particular municipal courts by special laws. 112 In an
important case where the problem could have been raised, the
requirement of the general laws provision was not even men-
tioned. 13 It is believed fair to assert that Ohio has, in this area
done violence to the policy favoring general legislation. It would
seem that this area would be an ideal one in which to use general
110142 Ohio St. 622, 53 N.E. 2d 787 (1944).
111 State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E.
647 (1925).
112 OHIo GEN. CoDo § 1558-1 et. seq.
113 State ex rel. Fox v. Yeatman, 98 Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913).
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legislation which varied the number of judges in relation to the
population of the communities served. The judiciary has the power
to determine the meaning of the constitutional requirement of
general laws in this field. The constitution is not crystal clear on
the point and the judges, therefore, should not be adverse to con-
sidering factors of policy and practicality. In many instances the
feasibility of a general statute is a policy determination rather
than an inevitable decision deduced from fixed principles.
Express Requirements of General Legislation
Article XIII, Section 6, which requires general laws for the
organization of municipalities may be regarded as a specific im-
plementation of Article II, Section 26, which, of course, applies
to municipalities also. Where a special statute attempts to regulate
municipal organization the court could point to either Article XIII,
Section 6, or to the general laws provision. In the same way,
Article X, Section 1, which requires general laws for the organi-
zation and government of counties, could be used as an alterna-
tive to the general laws provision.
Section 2 of Article XI requires general incorporation acts
for private corporations. It has been held that this provision grants
wide authority to form new corporations and to effect changes in
existing ones so long as general laws are utilized.11 4
Some Policy Factors
The plethora of interpretive problems arising under the con-
stitutional provisions examined in this article could lead one to
the conclusion that judicial determination of requirements of gen-
erality in legislation has not been altogether successful. Very few
subjects of legislation, however, are "naturally" the subject for
either a general or a special law. The very simplicity of the language
"[a]ll laws, of a general nature" may tend to lull one into a sense of
complacency as to the character of interpretive problems. Ex-
perience has shown that the problems under the general laws
provision are as formidable as those arising under the equally
simple phrase "all powers of local self-government" found in the
home rule amendment. Therefore, there must be one authoritative
interpreter.
Would the situation be improved by making the legislature
the sole judge of the applicability of a general law? There are
several arguments which can be mustered on the negative side.
Prior to the Beacom 15 case the legislature pretty much had the
final say and the record was one of evasion and disregard of the
constitutional mandate. An important argument is that legislative
l14 Belden v. Union Central Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E. 2d 629 (1944).
115 See note 39 supra.
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solutions frequently must be based on compromise and expediency.
The legislative process does not lend itself to that detached con-
sideration which is necessary for constitutional interpretation.
Another objection would be that legislative interpretation would
probably result in a patchwork of particular solutions rather than
an integrated pattern. Finally, it would be out of harmony with
the existing method of constitutional interpretation to entrust
this part of the constitution to the legislature.
On the other side of the argument is that a purely logical
analysis of the constitutional requirements is not enough. The judi-
cial process, so the argument would run, is not well fitted to make a
broad gauged inquiry into the considerations dictating the use of
a particular type of statute. The legislature could acquire the fac-
tual information on which a sound policy decision could be based.
If the legislative solution were deemed inappropriate, the law
could be repealed and a more workable one enacted. Other pro-
visions of the constitution could be relied upon to prevent legislative
abuse in this area. "The question, 'could a general law be made
applicable?' does not really call for interpretation and application
of existing law but requires a policy determination as to whether
the subject is one which could be effectually dealt with by general
law."11 6
We are committed to judicial review and it is at least doubtful
as to whether the Ohio Supreme Court should be displaced as the
arbiter of general as opposed to special legislation. Would it not
be more profitable to press for an affirmative vote on the question
of a constitutional convention at the general election in November,
1952 so that the whole question of the present constitutional re-
quirements of general and special laws could be opened? If this
were done, the court could be presented with a much more coherent
pattern than now obtains. It is incongruous to permit special laws
for the creation of inferior courts when there is no reason to be-
lieve that the subject is not readily susceptible to general legislation.
By the same reasoning, the special laws subject to local referendum
authorized in Article II, Section 30, are undesirable. 177
It cannot be overemphasized that the court's function in passing
on an initial legislative determination of the type of statute to
be employed is one calling for the exercise of judicial talents of
the highest order. The judges must steer a middle course between
credulity where only form supports the legislative determination
and over-zealousness for precision where the legislative determi-
nation appears rough but is nonetheless supportable. They should
116 FoRA.m , LocAL GovERNmIENT LAW 60 (1949).
117 See Fordham, Some Aspects of Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 23
Omo BAR 181, 186 (1950).
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recognize, for example, that in some circumstances a general law
may operate on a very limited number of persons and still be valid.
In the words of Judge Cardozo, "Time with its tides brings new
conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the
new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the new conditions affect
one only or a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow
as the mischief."1 8
118 Williams v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933).
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